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Unleashing Market Forces in Legal Education
and the Legal Profession
DEBORAH JONES MERRIT* AND DANIEL C. MERRITT
Law schools compete obsessively. They vie for students with the highest LSAT
scores and grade-point averages. They bid for the most widely cited professors.
They sponsor conferences and programs to capture public attention. Most of all,
they labor to improve their ranking in U.S. News and World Report, to outshine
the schools just above them and stay ahead of the ones just below. In the eyes of
many law professors, legal education is a highly competitive market.
As Brian Tamanaha explains in his groundbreaking book Failing Law
Schools,' this competition does little to benefit law students, practitioners, or
clients of the legal system. Law school tuition has skyrocketed, with many
students taking on more debt than they can reasonably repay.2 Employers
complain that, despite this expensive education, graduates lack basic practice
skills.3 Median starting salaries for law school graduates have dropped by twenty
percent in just two years,4 while jobs themselves have become much more
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1. See generally, BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLs (2012).
2. Id. at 107-25.
3. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Who Should Foot the Bill for the "Worthless" Young Associates?, WALL ST.
J. L. BLoG (Apr. 13, 2010, 11:03 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/13/who-should-foot-the-bill-for-the-
worthless-young-associates/ (reporting a general counsel's widely reported comment that first- and second-year
associates are "worthless"); Ashby Jones, Legal Heavies Tackle the First-Year Associate Dilemma, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009, 4:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.comlaw/2009/12/09/legal-heavies-tackle-the-first-year-
associate-dilemmal (describing earlier comments on the same issue).
4. NALP, the national association for legal career professionals, reports that the median salary for 2009 law
graduates was $72,000 nine months after graduation. The median salary for 2011 graduates, measured at the
same mark, was $60,000. Median Private Practice Starting Salaries for the Class of 2011 Plunge as Private
Practice Jobs Continue to Emde, NALP (July 12, 2012), http://www.nalp.org/classof20l1 salpressrel. NALP
reports the drop as 17%, but that calculation disregards inflation. If 2009 salaries had kept pace with inflation,
the median 2011 salary would have been $75,491. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bis.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?costl=72000&yearl=2009&year2=2011 (last visited March 16, 2013).
The drop to $60,000 represents a 20.5% decrease in real dollars.
Discouraging as these numbers already are, they overstate the salaries earned by many graduates. As
Professor Tamanaha and others have noted, entry-level salaries display a sharply bimodal distribution,
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 112-14, and reported salaries skew toward the high end of the distribution, id. at
146-54. In 2011, NALP reported salaries for only 18,630 graduates, just 41.9% of all graduates that year. Class
of 2011 Summary Report, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChartClassof20l1.pdf (last visited
Mar. 16, 2013). For further discussion of salaries earned by recent graduates, and of distortion in the reported
figures, see Paul Campos, The Crisis ofthe American Law School, 46 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 177 (Fall 2012).
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elusive.' At the same time that law graduates scramble to find jobs, a large
number of citizens struggle to find affordable legal services.6
How could market forces go so awry? If law schools compete so aggressively,
why doesn't the market produce tuition that better matches earning potential?
Why can't clients find lawyers to serve them? Why don't schools reduce class
size when graduates can't find jobs? Why don't schools differentiate their
training to serve different markets? Professor Tamanaha cogently outlines two
answers. First, legal educators have used the American Bar Association (ABA) to
secure accreditation standards that increase faculty salaries, reduce teaching
loads, and otherwise serve institutional interests. Sheltered by these standards,
law schools ward off cheaper competitors-while attributing their high tuition to
the necessary costs of quality education.
Second, law schools rely upon a deep well of federal loan dollars. Law
students don't have to pay for their schooling, at least not up front. The federal
government will disburse loans covering tuition and living costs to any student
enrolled in an accredited law school. Law schools need only admit willing
students, set tuition, and collect the loan money. The students and government
deal with the painful task of repayment, long after the student has departed
campus.
These two factors-partial capture of the accreditation body and guaranteed
government loans-assure that law schools do not compete in the type of market
that most businesses face. Rather than battling in an open field, law schools joust
in the courtyard of a heavily walled castle. The schools compete with one
another, not against open market forces. To cure this problem, Professor
Tamanaha proposes loosening the ABA's accreditation standards and restricting
the flow of federal loan dollars.
We agree with both Professor Tamanaha's diagnosis and his prescription. If we
are going to protect students, new lawyers, employers, clients, and the legal
system itself, we need to unleash market forces in legal education. This will
require changing accreditation standards, altering the process for setting those
standards, and limiting the government's blank-check support of legal education.
But we need to go even further. In this essay, we build upon Professor
5. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 114-18. The most recent figure reported by Professor Tamanaha is for the
class of 2009; 62.5% of those graduates obtained jobs requiring bar passage. That percentage has continued to
drop. In 2010, 59.9% of graduates secured jobs requiring bar passage; the following year, just 56.0% did. Class
of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, NALP (July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/
0712research (note that to determine the percentage of all graduates employed in jobs requiring bar admission,
it is necessary to multiply the percentage employed by the percentage employed in jobs requiring bar
admission). See also Campos, supra note 4, at 197-205 (offering further detail on jobs obtained by recent law
graduates).
6. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 170 ("Perversely, the United States has an oversupply of law graduates at the
same time that a significant proportion of the populace .. . go without legal assistance.").
7. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 172-81.
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Tamanaha's analysis by highlighting an even more important force that drives the
spiraling cost of legal education: trade restraints on law practice. To reduce the
unbearable price of legal education, improve the quality of that training, and
deliver affordable services to clients, we need to unleash market forces in law
practice itself.
I. THE LAWYER GUILD
Professor Tamanaha succinctly outlines the anti-competitive effects of ABA
accreditation standards for law schools. Early in the twentieth century, elite
schools persuaded the ABA to mandate three years of full-time study to earn a
law degree from an accredited school.8 Building on that success, schools used the
accreditation process to establish tenure protections,9 support higher faculty
salaries,'o lower teaching loads," and obtain other benefits for full-time faculty.
Law schools, in sum, created a legal educators' guild to maintain artificially high
benefits for members of that guild.' 2
But the law school guild operates within a broader one: the guild of the legal
profession. Every state maintains strict rules against the unauthorized practice of
law.13 Bar associations and individual lawyers vigorously enforce those rules,
using lawsuits and other measures to inhibit legal work by non-lawyers. 14 These
trade restrictions play a key role in propelling the price of legal education by
dividing those who are "authorized" to practice law from all others.
Observers sometimes scoff at the notion that the legal profession is a restricted
guild exacting economic rents from clients.'5 How can that possibly be true when
there is such a glut of lawyers? These critics overlook the fact that a guild can
allocate its excess profit to just a portion of its members.' 6 The remaining guild
members, who lack access to the cartel's profits, will compete for small rewards
8. Id. at 20-27.
9. Id. at 28-36. As Professor Tamanaha outlines in this chapter, a recent proposal would have diluted tenure
requirements in ABA accreditation standards. This proposal, predictably, elicited widespread condemnation
from schools, faculty organizations, and individual faculty.
10. Id. at 11-12, 14-16, 196n.16.
11. Id. at 11-12, 52-53.
12. For further description of the manner in which law schools used the accreditation process to secure
faculty benefits, see George B. Shepherd, Cartels and Controls in Legal Training, 45 ANTrrRUST BULL. 438,
445-50 (2000).
13. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2011); Deborah L. Rhode,
Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
369, 401, 405-11 (2004); Rhode, supra note 13.
15. Economic rents are "profit[s] earned in excess of the return a perfectly competitive market would yield."
Illinois v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481 (7th Cir. 1991).
16. See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis ofJurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (Winter 1993) ("[S]o long
as the number of lawyers is limited" to some extent, "some lawyers, at least, will enjoy monopoly returns.").
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or leave the profession. This creates the appearance of an oversupply of lawyers.
As we explain further below, the apparent "glut" can even support the guild's
economic power.
How does the expensive system of legal education, so evocatively described
by Professor Tamanaha, serve the larger guild? Lawyers, like other professional
guild members, face an ongoing challenge. They want to restrict entry to protect
profits, but they must allow enough new entrants to minimally satisfy consumers;
otherwise, society will overturn the guild's monopoly. Furthermore, professional
guilds perform complex services that take time to master. These guilds cannot
admit new members only as old ones die off. Instead, a professional guild must
admit and train new entrants on a regular basis.' 7
There are three principal ways that guilds address this conundrum. First, some
guilds strictly limit entry at the outset of professional training. In addition to
achieving the guild's aim in the most direct way, this approach allows the guild to
focus training on a small number of new entrants. The guild can tout this benefit
to the public in order to justify both the limited entry and the guild's excess
profits. "Our training," this approach suggests, "is so special and so expensive
that we can offer it to only a very limited number of people." For the new
entrants, this is the happiest path: Once admitted, they are virtually certain to
share eventually in the guild's profits. As long as the guild admits sufficient
entrants to minimally serve consumers, it can maintain its dominance.
Second, guilds can restrict entry by making the path to full guild membership
very long, arduous, and expensive. A large number of hopefuls may start down
this path, each individually confident in success.18 But as time goes on, some
entrants will not be able to bear the ongoing investments of time and expense;
they will fall by the wayside. Others will realize that, although they have the
energy to continue, the pay-off is too remote. Rather than continue to invest
heavily in the guild profession, they will switch to a field that offers more
immediate reward. Still other hopefuls, witnessing the long path to guild entry,
will avoid the profession entirely. In all of these ways, long entry paths
effectively pare the number of people who ultimately share in the guild's
profits. 1
17. See id. at 10 ("[A] guild must make provisions for its continuation into the indefinite future. Even if the
guild's members have no concern about its flourishing after they are dead, the guild cannot hope to retain its
privileged status . .. if it does not hold out reasonable assurances of being able to supply the [society's] ...
needs for the indefinite future.").
18. Two related biases, one based on self-enhancement and the other on optimism, stoke this confidence. See,
e.g., Carlo Caponecchia, It Won't Happen to Me: An Investigation of Optimism Bias in Occupational Health
and Safety, 40 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 601 (2010); David Dunning, et al., Flawed Self-Assessment:
Implications for Health, Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. SC. Pus. INTEREST 69 (2004); Gregory S.
Preuss & Mark D. Alicke, Everybody Loves Me: Self-Evaluations and Metaperceptions of Dating Popularity,
35 PERSONALTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 937 (2009).
19. Pre-industrial craft guilds and modern professions have both relied upon this technique. See, e.g.,
Sheilagh Ogilvie, Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence fmm German Proto-Industry, 58 ECON. HisT.
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Strenuous entry paths also suggest to the public that the guild practices a very
difficult profession, one that requires many years and expensive training to
master. Successful guild members can point to those factors to justify their
eventual profits. 2 0 Long, difficult, and expensive training can also increase the
public's reliance on the guild; consumers may fear that unregulated practitioners,
lacking this extensive training, would provide defective services.
Despite these advantages for the guild, this second approach can be quite
damaging for new entrants. Newcomers almost certainly invest more time and
money in their training than is necessary; the guild has artificially increased
training demands to reduce entry. Aspirants who leave the profession before
receiving any guild profits suffer even more: they may lose the full value of their
investment.
The final way that professional guilds can limit entry is through intramural
competitions. Under this approach, the guild allows many hopefuls to begin
training, and even to invest substantially in that training. Ultimately, however, the
guild permits only a small number of entrants to reach the highest levels of guild
status and profit-making. Aspirants advance only when they "make the cut" in
successive competitions. These competitive hurdles, like the lengthy training
paths in the previous approach, signal consumers that the successful guild
members have superior skills: they are the ones who have bested all other
competitors. This perception, in turn, helps justify the guild's artificially high
21prices.
This final approach is particularly costly for many guild entrants. Newcomers
may invest heavily in their training, only to be knocked out of the running. When
they fail to achieve guild success, these entrants may blame themselves rather
than the guild's structure. Even when entrants succeed, they may remain wary of
other guild members. Ongoing competition can diminish collegiality in the guild.
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive; guilds can adopt a mixture
of styles. The American medical profession relies primarily on the first approach,
tightly limiting the number of students accepted into medical school and
residencies each year.22 But the profession also draws upon the second path,
REv. 286, 307-08 (2004) (noting that long apprenticeships and entry fees helped pre-industrial guilds restrict
entry); Posner, supra note 17, at 6 ("The most characteristic ... professional restriction today is a requirement
of protracted formal education including some, and sometimes a lot of, specialized university-type education,
plus proof of intellectual competence demonstrated by passing a demanding written examination.").
20. See Posner, supra note 16, at 11 ("[T]he longer the period of apprenticeship the more plausibly can the
guild represent to the public that making a high-quality product is a task requiring unusual skill that can be
acquired only by lengthy training.").
21. Free markets, of course, also produce competition; some businesses prosper while others fail. Guild
tournaments differ from market competition because the guild determines the rules and can artificially limit the
number of winners. As we explain below in the context of legal services, these guild-controlled competitions do
little to benefit consumers. See infra text following note 51.
22. See, e.g., MILTIN FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 150-51 (1962); David Blumenthal, New Steam
from an Old Cauldron-The Physician-Supply Debate, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1780 (2004).
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23creating a long, arduous, and expensive path to full licensure. No one knows if
doctors need as much training as they currently receive-or if the training needs
to cost as much as it does. Successful guild members set the standards, and
aspiring doctors have no choice but to meet them.
The United States legal profession has not been able to limit entry as overtly as
the medical profession has. The American public wants doctors to train at top
hospitals with cutting-edge technologies. Physicians, the AMA, and the federal
government all point to the expense of those facilities as limiting the pipeline for
doctors.24 Legal education does not require that type of capital investment; nor
does it offer other rationales for strict entry barriers.
Antitrust laws further limit the legal profession's ability to restrict entry. As
Professor Tamanaha recounts, the Department of Justice sued the ABA for using
its accreditation standards to restrict creation of low-cost law schools.2 5 If the
ABA attempted to limit the number of law school seats even more openly, the
Department surely would intervene.26
The legal profession, however, quite effectively employs the second and third
approaches to guild maintenance. The profession has designed a long, arduous,
and expensive route to licensure. It has also created a highly competitive system
in which only a small number of contestants achieve the positions that deliver
the highest economic rents. We summarize these features of the legal profession
below, and then briefly outline their costs to prospective lawyers, clients who
need legal services, and the profession itself.
A. THE LONG PATH TO BECOMING A LAWYER
Aspiring attorneys travel a long road from high school graduation to bar
admission, one that includes seven years of higher education and a bar
examination. To secure a steady legal job, they often must serve a variety of
summer or part-time internships while in school; many of these internships are
unpaid. Increasingly, prospective lawyers undertake low-paid fellowships or
other temporary positions after graduation to further enhance their employabil-
23. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 151.
24. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 22. Government programs help support medical residency programs,
giving the government a role in determining the number of training slots available for doctors.
25. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at I1-19.
26. Conversely, the medical profession has been able to deflect antitrust challenges. In 2002, for example, a
group of medical students challenged the system that matches students to medical residencies as anti-
competitive. See Adam Liptak, Medical Students Sue Over Residency System, N.Y. TIMEs (May 7, 2002),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/us/medical-students-sue-over-residency-system.html?page
wanted=all&src=pm. The court dismissed the lawsuit after Congress amended the antitrust laws to confirm
that medical residencies do not violate those laws. 15 U.S.C. § 37(b) (2004); Sara Robinson, Antitrust Suit Over




ity.27 Even after obtaining a "permanent" job, the graduate has not fully pene-
trated the profession. She will invest several more years working as a subordinate
lawyer, often changing jobs several times.2 8 A measure of professional autonomy,
stability, and economic reward will come only after many more years in the
workforce.
Aspiring lawyers do not simply clock time on this path; every step requires
intense intellectual and emotional effort. Most students admitted to law school
have earned top academic records from well-regarded colleges. They have also
obtained high scores on the LSAT, often after extensive test preparation. Law
school classes themselves are challenging. At the same time that they complete
those classes, many students participate in a demanding schedule of law journal
or moot court activities, other extracurricular organizations, and workplace
experiences. These activities are important resume builders in today's job market.
After graduation, potential lawyers face a grueling bar exam; state supreme
courts have repeatedly increased the length and difficulty of that exam.29 Once in
practice, new lawyers endure long hours, demanding (and often tedious) work,
and uncertain futures.
Finally, this path is shockingly expensive. Professor Tamanaha details the
dramatic rise in law school tuition between 1985 and 2009. In constant dollars,
the cost of a private law school education more than doubled during those years;
the price of attending a public school more than quadrupled.3 0 And law schools
have not slowed the rate of tuition increases since Professor Tamanaha finished
gathering his data. Private schools averaged five percent tuition increases in both
2010 and 2011; public schools raised tuition for in-state students by ten percent
the first year and nine percent the next.3 ' During these same years, job openings
27. Law schools themselves are funding many of these fellowships. See New Research on Law School
Funded Positions for Law School Graduates, NALP BULL. (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/
sept l2researchIsfunded. Graduates take these temporary, low-paid positions with the hope that they may lead
to higher paying permanent jobs.
28. See RoNrr DINOVIlZER, ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL
CAREERS 54 (2009) (finding that within three years of law school graduation, more than a third of lawyers had
changed jobs at least once; over the next four years, almost two-thirds did so).
29. See Deborah J. Merritt, et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of Recent Increases to Passing
Scores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 929 (2001) (examining changes made to bar passing scores during
the 1990s); Shepherd, supra note 12, at 444 (noting that states lowered bar exam pass rates in the 1920s and
1930s to reduce "overcrowding" in the profession).
30. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 108-09. Paul Campos places these numbers in context by comparing them to
median household income, which has been stagnant for the last forty years. Professor Campos concludes, "A
legal education, which a generation ago was easily within the financial reach of the American middle class, and
was to some extent a realistic career option even for people of more modest socio-economic backgrounds, has
now become an enormously expensive investment." Campos, supra note 4, at 183.
31. Law School Tuition, 1985-2011, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
abaladministrative/legaleducation and-admissionstothe bar/statisticsflstuition.authcheckdam.pdf (last
visited Apr. 25, 2013). Schools have offset some of these increases with enhanced scholarship aid but, as
graduates' heavy loan burdens suggest, scholarships have not kept pace with tuition. See infra notes 37-40 and
accompanying text. In addition, most law schools tie scholarships to LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs,
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and salaries plummeted for new law school graduates.3 2
In addition to paying high tuition, law students incur other financial burdens.
Taking three years out of the job market imposes heavy opportunity costs. 3 3
Many students eschew all paying work during their first year, devoting their
full attention to studies and maximizing class rank. Even during their second and
third years, ABA rules prohibit students from working more than twenty hours a
week while enrolled as full-time students. 34 On top of these costs, students pay
for LSAT preparation courses, living expenses during law school, job-hunting
costs, bar admission fees, and courses to cram for the bar exam. For students who
must accept low-paid fellowships after graduation simply to stay in the running
for a permanent job, the expenses mount still further.
These costs saddle a majority of law school graduates with crushing debt. As
Professor Tamanaha documents, nearly ninety percent of law students graduated
with debt in 2010; the average amount borrowed for law school approached
$100,000.35 Even that figure understates the extent of law student debt: it
excludes college loans; bar-study loans; private loans for law school; 3 6 interest
accrued during law school;37 and interest accrued during the six months after law
school, when most graduates must devote their time to bar study and job
seeking.
rather than need; they also award scholarship aid very unevenly. A few students in each class may obtain a free
ride, while others receive partial scholarships. At least some in each class, however, will pay the full-and ever
rising-list price tuition.
32. See supra notes 4-5. Inflation has also been quite low in recent years. The average annual rate of inflation
decreased 0.4% between 2008 and 2009; increased 1.6% from 2009 to 2010; increased 3.2% from 2010 to 2011;
and increased 2.1% from 2011 to 2012. Consumer Price Index: All Urban Consumers, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STAXIsTICs, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
33. For an excellent discussion of the opportunity costs, see Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree
a Good Investment Today?, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 301 (2012).
34. American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools § 304(f),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/misclegaleducation/Standards/
chapter_3-2012_2013_aba_standardsand_rules.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
35. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 120.
36. Although most law students use federally funded loans to finance law school, some still use private bank
loans. Private loans allow students to choose variable, rather than fixed, interest rates. In the current market,
variable rates are much lower than the government's fixed rate; those rates are attractive to students who believe
they will pay off their loans quickly. On March 30, 2013, for example, Discover Bank was offering a variable
law school loan with a rate as low as 3.25% APR. https://www.discover.constudent-loans/private-student-loans/
law-school-loans.html.
37. Until recently, the federal government subsidized interest on the first $8,500 of federally backed loans
disbursed to law students each year; no interest accrued on that principal until after graduation. Interest did,
however, accrue on federal loans above that amount. Since July 1, 2012, professional students no longer benefit
from the interest subsidy; they accrue interest on the full amount of their federal loan from the day that the loan
is disbursed. Recent Changes to the Student Aid Programs, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc., OFFICE OF FED. STUDEwr AID,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/aboutlannouncements/recent-changes (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
38. Law school "debt" figures derive from information that the ABA gathers from all law schools. The
annual questionnaire requests information only on "law school debt" that is "processed through the university or
law school financial aid office." ABA 2011 Annual Questionnaire, Part 4, Financial Aid, at 1. Those instructions
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In addition to reflecting the length and expense of the guild's training path,
this debt creates an independent barrier to guild-weakening competition. Law
graduates burdened with heavy debt cannot easily challenge guild norms. Sup-
pose a new lawyer has an innovative idea for creating a lower-priced practice, or
one that serves a new client niche. How will the lawyer fund that venture? Banks
will hesitate to lend money to unproven professionals who already bear
significant debt, and the rules of "professional conduct" foreclose other options.
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer cannot seek outside
investors in her practice--or even partner with a non-lawyer.3 9 High debt
significantly impedes the ability of new lawyers to finance practice models that
might shake up the market.
Junior lawyers face other pressures to follow guild practices. During their early
careers, most lawyers work directly for senior colleagues or seek referrals from
them. Having invested heavily in their own training, these new lawyers hesitate
to impair their advancement and lose the opportunity to share in guild profits.
Heavy debt exacerbates these pressures, creating career risks for lawyers who
challenge the status quo. Today's graduates, furthermore, will remain in debt for a
substantial portion of their careers. As Professor Tamanaha reveals, many will not
make their last loan repayments until after they have celebrated their twenty-fifth
law school reunions.4 0 A quarter-century of nondischargeable debt erects a
substantial barrier to innovation.
Through these avenues, the legal profession effectively deploys a long,
difficult, and expensive training path to limit entry to the guild's most fa-
vored positions. Clarence Darrow recognized this mechanism early in the last
century:
exclude private loans, which are not processed through those offices. Id. The instructions also expressly exclude
"post J.D. loans (i.e. bar loans) even if distributed prior to graduation." Id. Finally, the questionnaire requests
information on the "average amount borrowed in law school," not any accrued interest related to those amounts.
Id. at 6. Law schools follow these instructions to the letter, reporting only these carefully circumscribed
"amount[s] borrowed."
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.4 (2009). An ABA Commission recently refused to make even
minor amendments to this rule. See Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will
Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms (Apr. 16, 2012) avail-
able at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/20120416_news-release-
re nonlawyerownership_1aw-firms.authcheckdam.pdf.
40. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 119. The 25-year period stems from the government's "Income Based
Repayment" program, which extends the traditional 10-year repayment to as long as 25 years. As Professor
Tamanaha carefully explains, graduates using this 25-year option will pay substantially more interest than
lawyers who are able to repay their loans within 10 years. For some students, the loans will even suffer negative
amortization under the 25-year plan. Id. at 121.
A new program, "Pay As You Earn," offers lower monthly payments than Income Based Repayment and
forgives debt after 20 years. Pay As You Earn Plan, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-eam (last visited Apr. 25 2013). This pro-
gram, like Income Based Repayment, has both costs and benefits for debtors.
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The bar association of to-day lay down every conceivable condition; they re-
quire a longer preliminary study, and exact a college education and long
courses in law schools, to keep new members out of the closed circle. The Law-
yers' Union is about as anxious to encourage competition as the Plumbers'
Union is, or the United States Steel Co., or the American Medical Associa-
tion.41
The mechanics for restricting guild entry are the same today as they were when
Darrow wrote, except that the path has become even longer, more strenuous, and
42more expensive.
B. INTRAMURAL TOURNAMENTS
The legal profession also relies upon intramural tournaments to restrict entry
to the most remunerative positions in the guild. The first stage of competition
occurs with law school admission. Schools vary enormously in their ability to
provide lucrative and desirable jobs for their graduates; applicants understand
this fact. 4 3 Prospective lawyers carefully weigh the competitive advantage that
various schools will give them in the marketplace. They also recognize the rules
of the admissions contest, particularly the importance of high LSAT scores.
Applicants who do not win sufficiently attractive admissions offers will invest in
additional test-prep courses, retake the test, and hope for a better outcome in the
next admissions cycle. From the very start, lawyer-hopefuls fight an intensely
competitive battle.
Competition mounts during the first year of law school, when most schools
enforce strict grading curves. The top ten percent of every class will enjoy
opportunities largely inaccessible to the other ninety percent. The top students
are more likely to receive invitations to the flagship law review, to obtain jobs
through on-campus interviewing, and to secure the best jobs available to
graduates of their school. As Professor Tamanaha recounts, students "speak
41. CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF My LiFE 29 (1932).
42. See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 451 (noting that lawyers benefit from the current system of legal
education, including the expensive benefits demanded by faculty members, because "[w]hen faculty help
themselves by increasing the price of legal education, by limiting the number of law schools, and by limiting
student-faculty ratios, their efforts benefit existing lawyers by reducing the number of new lawyers").
We focus in this essay primarily on the role of law schools within this entry path. Law firms and other legal
employers, however, also contribute to the path's length and expense. The period of "associateship," for
example, is one in which a new lawyer both hones his skills and contributes to the partner's profits. The usual
financial arrangement pays associates less than the revenue they generate; the excess rewards the partner for the
training and client access she offers the associate. This arrangement is remarkably similar to one that many
medieval craft guilds employed.
43. For a window into applicants' awareness, skim the entries in any of the forums at Top-Law-Schools.com,
TLS Forums, ToP-LAw-SCHOOLS.coM, http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/index.php. Commenters on
that site meticulously analyze their career prospects at different law schools.
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enviously of [these] classmates who won the 'lottery."'" After just one year of
law school, the profession has already sorted likely winners from losers.
The race continues throughout law school, with upper-level grades, moot court
honors, and leadership positions on law reviews. 45 At the same time, students
compete to secure advantageous externships, summer positions, and part-time
jobs. Students who lost the first-year lottery can recoup some competitive
standing through these efforts. Law school grades alone, however, remain a
major factor in predicting future success.46 The profession does not have places
for every graduate; the results of these intramural competitions help determine
which graduates will obtain law-related jobs.47
After law school, graduates face a key competition: the bar exam. Without bar.
passage, a graduate cannot practice law. State supreme courts and bar associa-
tions keep an eye on bar passage rates; if the percentage rises too high, they
toughen the exam. 4 8 As a result, the bar exam is a competitive exercise-pitting
applicants against one another-rather than a stable measure of ability that all
qualified applicants will surmount.
In the workplace itself, the battle continues. Some organizations have room
for all attorneys to advance, but many do not. The competition is particularly
fierce at the largest law firms, where the access to monopoly profits is most likely.
Several scholars have written about the "tournament style" of employment at
these firms.4 9 Of the dozens of lawyers hired initially by these firms, only a select
few become partners. Indeed, an increasing number of firms have added new
44. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at x. Cf Posner, supra note 16, at 14 (noting the competition for success among
earlier generations of English barristers and the fate of "those who lost out in the barrister lottery").
45. More than thirty years ago, one of the first author's law school classmates observed: "The summer after
our first year, I thought law school was an institution designed to make 90% of the class unhappy. Now that the
law review board of editors has been announced, I understand that it is an institution designed to make all but
one person unhappy." A few weeks later, a different classmate complained about the process for seeking judicial
clerkships. "I don't understand why it takes the judges so long to select clerks," he opined. "There's a
recognized hierarchy ofjudges and a recognized hierarchy of law students. It shouldn't be so hard to match them
up." Today's law students offer similarly cynical observations about hierarchy in the legal profession.
46. See Richard Sander & Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The Secret of My Success: How Status, Eliteness, and
School Performance Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 893, 895 (demonstrating the strong
influence of law school performance on career outcomes).
47. Nine months after graduation, just 56.0% of the class of 2011 reported holding jobs that required bar
admission. See NALP Bulletin, supra note 5. Students at high-ranked schools are more likely to obtain these
jobs than students at lower-ranked ones, TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 117. Notably, however, some graduates at
every school obtain jobs-while some at every school fail to do so. This pattern reflects the series of ongoing
tournaments that mark legal education.
48. Courts and bar associations commonly describe this practice as a desire to keep their passing rates at or
below rates in other states; they do not want their bar exam to seem too "easy" compared to the exams in other
states. See generally Merritt et al., supra note 29, at 939.
49. See, e.g., MARc GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
BIG LAW FIRM (1991); Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Large Law Firm Misery: It's the Tournament,
Not the Money, 52 VAND. L. REv. 953 (1999); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament
of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms,
84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).
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levels of tournament play by creating several tiers of partners.
These intramural competitions offer few benefits to clients. The contests do
little to lower prices; indeed, many law firm associates secure advancement by
billing high hours to clients. Intramural competitions, furthermore, waste client
and firm investments by discarding skilled lawyers when there is insufficient
room at the top. Nor do the tournaments necessarily select the highest quality
lawyers from a client's perspective. Associates win promotion by pleasing
partners; they have little opportunity to develop innovative business structures
that clients might favor.
Law schools, meanwhile, are far removed from client demands. Schools have
some incentive to produce lawyers who will succeed in the guild; that brings
both reputational acclaim and alumni donations to the school. But the link is
attenuated, and schools rarely see firsthand what types of education might benefit
clients. The organizations that control the first key levels of guild competition,
therefore, know little about client needs. The competitions that law schools
create, for both entry and internal success, may not produce the lawyers who
would serve clients best.
For lawyers, the series of intramural competitions serves many purposes. The
contests help identify the aspirants who are willing to dedicate themselves to the
guild, serving long hours in training or subordinate positions. The tournaments
also provide some information about a lawyer's ability and responsiveness to
clients. Most important for guild members, the competitions limit the number of
lawyers who share the guild's greatest profits-while maintaining the appearance
of an open profession determined to identify the "best" players to serve clients.so
C. THE COST OF RESTRAINTS
What are the costs of the guild system described above? Most guilds, however
they are maintained, cost the consumer money.5' Several economists, using a
variety of approaches, have demonstrated empirically that the United States legal
profession does reap excess profits from its guild status.52 These unearned rents
burden individual consumers and the collective economy. Equally worrisome in
the current era of economic change and global competition is the fact that
50. Cf Posner, supra note 16, at 14 (noting the competition for success among earlier generations of English
barristers).
51. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 148 ("[Licensure] almost inevitably becomes a tool in the hands of a special
producer group to obtain a monopoly position at the expense of the rest of the public."); CLIFFORD WINSTON,
ET AL., FIRST THING WE Do, LET's DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS 96 (2011) ("[E]conomic theory provides
strong a priori reasons ... to expect that lawyers [benefiting from entry restraints] may earn premiums that are
attributable to market inefficiencies.").
52. WINSION, ET. AL., supra note 51, at 16-18, 21-28 (summarizing studies); Mario Pagliero, What Is the
Objective of Professional Licensing? Evidence from the US Market for Lawyers, 29 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 473,
481 (2011); Mario Pagliero, Licensing Exam Difficulty and Entry Salaries in the US Market for Lawyers,
48 BRYT. J. INDUS. REL. 726, 736-37 (2010).
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professional barriers to entry hamper innovation in law practice.53 Guild law-
yers have little incentive to devise cheaper, more responsive methods of de-
livering client services. Indeed, the heavy debt borne by new lawyers encourages
them to follow guild practices in the hope of eventually achieving the promised
pay-off.
In addition to these significant losses, Professor Tamanaha's work plainly
demonstrates the costs 'of the current guild system for aspiring lawyers. By
maintaining a system that invites a large number of entrants; extracts substantial
investments of time and money from those applicants; and then ruthlessly
winnows winners from losers, law schools and practitioners sustain a cartel that
handsomely rewards its most established members. At the same time, the system
imposes heartbreaking costs on the aspirants. Too many law students start with a
dream of practicing a professionally rewarding and financially secure job-but
end with a nightmare of debt and limited employment opportunities.
These costs have grown too large to countenance. As Professor Tamanaha
recognizes, "[l]aw school has always had winners and losers in job prospects
among graduates." 54 The profession, in other words, has always used intra-
mural contests to restrict access to the highest guild levels. Similarly, for at least
the last century, the profession has maintained long and expensive entry paths for
prospective lawyers. "The difference today," as Professor Tamanaha writes, "is
that the enormous run up in tuition of the last three decades, and the student debt
this produces, imposes a severe penalty on losers that did not exist in past
generations." 5 Both our profession and the larger society must confront the
implications of that severe penalty.5
53. See, e.g., WINSTON, FT. AL., supra note 51, at 73-75; Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation:
The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1689,
1709-28 (2008); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal
Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 155 (2010); Larry E. Ribstein,
The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 749, 803 (2010); Shepherd, supra note 12, at 460 (legal profession's
trade barriers push lawyers to offer only high-priced services rather than designing "cheaper but serviceable"
products).
54. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at x.
55. Id.
56. In an earlier essay, we set out the responsibilities that professionals assume in return for restraints of
trade. See Deborah J. Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, Responsibility-Rights in the Legal Profession, 43 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 1257 (2011). If practitioners and legal educators honored those responsibilities, potential lawyers would not
confront the severe penalties they face today; the profession would establish more reasonable training paths. See
also Paul Horwitz, What Ails the Law Schools?, 111 MICH. L. REv. 6 (2013) (urging law schools to exercise their
responsibilities in a way that better addresses client needs). As we acknowledged in our earlier essay, however,
responsibility-rights run counter to human nature. Law schools, like other organizations, do not always fulfill
their highest responsibilities. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that schools have engaged in a surprising amount
of deceptive and unethical behavior. See generally Ben Trachtenberg, Law School Marketing and Legal Ethics,
91 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming June 2013) (describing a wide range of ethical violations in law school
marketing). When a profession cannot match responsibilities to rights, competition provides a better solution.
Merritt & Merritt, supra, at 1269-7 1.
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II. THE CASE FOR THE MARKET
There is only one sure way to eliminate the penalties identified by Professor
Tamanaha: deregulate the legal profession by abolishing prohibitions against
the unauthorized practice of law. As long as lawyers maintain their professional
walls, sharply dividing those who are "authorized" to practice law from all
others, they will charge high prices to potential entrants. Where there are walls,
there are gatekeepers. Where there are gatekeepers, there are opportunities to
extract excess tolls.57
Imagine, for example, that the legal profession adopted one of Professor
Tamanaha's recommendations: "two years of book learning followed by a one-
year apprenticeship."58 This is a plausible proposal; it might achieve the optimal
mix between classroom instruction and hands-on training. But there is no reason
to believe that this route would be cheaper for aspiring lawyers. The same
economic factors that allow law schools to charge excessive tuition for three
years of instruction will allow them to set high rates for a two-year degree. 9 The
practitioners who offer apprenticeships, meanwhile, will acquire their own
gatekeeper power; they may turn apprenticeships into training programs with
fees of their own. Prospective lawyers may start borrowing to fund both law
school and post-graduate training.6 0
Capping government loan programs might rein in these costs, but it would not
eliminate excessively high fees for people seeking to enter the legal profession.
The root problem lies in the trade restraints surrounding the profession itself.
Those restraints both allow the profession to restrict entry and give it a strong
motive to do so. Lawyers do not sell bar admissions in the same way that
New York City sells taxi medallions; we do not coin a limited number of seats
57. See WINSTON, ET AL., supra note 51, at 90-91 (observing that high law school tuition "in part reflect[s] the
future premiums to be earned by lawyers," and suggesting that deregulation of the profession would lower costs
of training); Shepherd, supra note 12, at 452 (describing the professional "bottleneck" enjoyed by accredited
law schools, which "gives virtually complete control not only over the market for faculty, but also over the
downstream markets for legal training and legal services").
58. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 173.
59. Northwestern Law School made headlines when it offered an accelerated JD program, allowing
participants to earn the degree in two calendar years. The school, however, "prices tuition by the degree pursued
rather than the length of enrollment." Northwestern Law, Tuition and Financial Aid, http://www.law.north
westem.edulacademics/ajd/tuition-financialaid.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). Two-year students, there-
fore, pay the same total tuition as those who pursue the conventional three-year program. Id.
60. Competition in both the classroom and apprenticeship markets might curtail some of these prices.
Schools might compete with scholarships to attract the most credentialed students to two-year programs, just as
they currently compete to admit those students to three-year programs. Law firms, similarly, might compete for
the best apprentices by offering higher wages. The track record within legal education, however, suggests that
this competition would be limited. Over time, the cost of attending law school has risen dramatically, despite
some competition for the best students. The barriers to professional entry, we assert, are a major cause of those




and sell them to the highest bidders. 6' Instead, the profession uses the re-
quirement of bar admission to fashion a long, strenuous, and expensive entry path
marked by a series of harsh intramural competitions. Law schools profit from that
system, but so do established members of the profession. We can tweak the path's
features, but the heavy costs for professional aspirants won't disappear unless the
underlying restraints dissolve.
There is another, equally imperative reason to fix legal education by elim-
inating the inefficient restraints underlying the profession. Our profession has
entered a time of profound change, in which technology, global competition, and
commoditization are reshaping the delivery of legal services.62 Direct market
forces offer the best hope of matching professional preparation to clients' rapidly
changing demands. Law schools, accrediting agencies, and bar admission
authorities all operate within their own bubbles. As long as schools are preparing
graduates for guild admission, rather than directly to serve clients, they will not
respond efficiently to client needs.
We agree with Professor Tamanaha that loosening accreditation standards
would allow law schools to innovate; differentiating their programs to compete
for applicants. But the ingenuity of law faculty is limited. They may recognize
the demand for a "Holiday Inn-type law school" to supplement more luxurious
modes.6 3 Faculty, however, are less likely to recognize that clients want an
entirely different service, such as campgrounds or bowling alleys. Open markets
are the most efficient way to channel information from consumers to producers.
What would this open market look like? It would operate under the same rules
that regulate other business markets in the United States; clients would benefit
from a large number of consumer-protection and anti-fraud laws. Clients,
however, could hire any individual or organization they chose to perform their
legal work. Many clients would still choose experienced practitioners with JDs
for their work. Others would find that a paralegal, college graduate who had
majored in law, or professional with one year of "law school" could do the job.
Some client needs would require customized services, while others would benefit
from standardized forms or interactive websites.
At an earlier time, clients might have lacked sufficient information to choose
among these services. But in today's information age, clients have resources to
assess skill and trustworthiness. Service providers have strong incentives to build
61. For a recent description of the market for taxi medallions, see Dan Cumming, Why Has the Price of Taxi
Medallions Increased So Dramatically? An Analysis of the Taxi Medallion Market, 17 THE PARK PLACE
EcoNoMisT 12 (2009), available at http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol l7/iss 1/9 (last visited Mar. 16,
2013).
62. For a leading discussion of these changes, see RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING
THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (rev. ed. 2010); see also William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S.
Lawyers: Generalists, Specialists, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REv. 1 (2011) (discussing these market changes
in the context of legal education), available at http://papers.ssrn.consol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1809866.
63. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 174.
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their reputations and provide information about their skills-especially when
those providers can no longer rely upon guild protection. Prospective clients
would gain access, not only to new types of legal services, but to a wide range of
information about those services. Bar associations, consumer groups, and client
organizations could supplement that information by certifying lawyers who met
particular performance standards. 6Those certificates would carry more nuanced
information than the blunt signal of bar admission. Courts could also toughen
malpractice standards for lawyers, aligning them with standards imposed on
doctors.
In a few contexts, poor professional performance imposes negative exter-
nalities on third parties. An incompetent trial lawyer, for example, wastes the
time of the court, the jury, opposing counsel, and any adverse parties. Similar
externalities may occur in administrative hearings and other procedures that
involve multiple parties. Courts and other adjudicators could address this prob-
lem by requiring counsel to demonstrate competence before appearing in the
forum. These competency requirements might be as rigorous as current bar
examinations, although they would focus on skill sets most relevant to the forum.
A federal district court, for example, might test prospective counsel more
rigorously on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than on the rule against
perpetuities.66
Law schools would find many opportunities to sell their services in this
market. Some might specialize in producing lawyers who practice in court.
Others might tailor their education for transactional lawyers, eliminating ex-
pensive litigation training. Still others would continue to offer the traditional
"fully rounded" JD. Colleges might begin offering degrees tailored to certain
64. See WINSTON, ET AL., supra note 53, at 87 (citing examples of current certification schemes); id. at 83
(noting that states could even continue offering bar exams as a quality measure, publishing results to potential
clients); Adam B. Summers, Licensing Lawyers: Failure in the Provision of Legal Services, in THE PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: LAW AND EcONOMICS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONs 235, 250-53 (Edward J. L6pez ed. 2010) (noting current
and potential certification schemes for legal practitioners). Since any organization could provide certification,
bar associations would not be able to capture that process to continue the profession's guild status. Experience in
other fields suggests that a range of consumer and professional associations would offer certification services.
65. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?,
59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 491-502 (2008) (documenting that current rules treat lawyers more leniently than doctors).
66. The Multistate Bar Exam (MBE) does not currently test knowledge of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, although the examiners will add the subject in February 2015. See Gulp! Civil Procedure will be
added to Multistate Bar Exam, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 8, 2013, 10:07 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/
article/gulpscivil-procedurewillbeaddedtomultistatebarexam/. The MBE does require knowledge of
the rule against perpetuities. See National Conference of Bar Examiners, Subject Matter Outlines, http://
www.ncbex.org/assets/mediafiles/Information-Booklets/SMOs-from-MBEIB2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 16,
2013).
In an open system, different courts might adopt different exams; this could impose burdens on attorneys
appearing before several courts. That burden, however, is no greater than the one attorneys currently face when
they practice in more than one state. Indeed, exams qualifying lawyers for court practice probably would cover
fewer subjects than the general bar exams that states currently administer.
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types of legal work. Community colleges could expand their paralegal pro-
grams. Part-time and online programs might proliferate as practitioners moved
from one level of expertise to another. The market would generate approaches
that we can't even imagine-approaches that are unlikely to originate from the
crabbed creativity of law faculties preparing students for a unitary profession.
We conclude by addressing two concerns frequently voiced about deregula-
tion. First, will deregulation allow untrained, unscrupulous hacks to prey upon
unsuspecting consumers? Of course it will, but no more so than the current
system of regulation. Scholars have repeatedly complained that courts and bar
committees do a poor job of disciplining incompetent or dishonest lawyers.6 7
Disciplinary authorities are reluctant to penalize colleagues within their own
guild; judges, similarly, resist malpractice actions against fellow lawyers.68 An
open market for legal services would not abandon all regulation; it would replace
self-interested guild regulation with all of the anti-fraud and consumer protection
laws available in our legal system.69
Deregulation might, in fact, increase the quality of legal work. A few em-
pirical studies suggest that, at least in some law-related fields, non-lawyers
provide better services than lawyers-not just cheaper service, but higher quality
service.70 United States consumers are already voting with their feet on that
issue, hiring non-lawyers for a wide range of legal work when they cannot afford
guild prices.7 ' Rather than relegating that market to the shadows, or attempting to
suppress these initiatives, our society could benefit consumers by embracing the
full scope of providers who can offer law-related assistance.
Finally, how will we provide legal services to the poor? Without the ideals of a
protected profession, will any lawyers step forward to offer pro bono legal
assistance? The answer to this question, sadly, is straightforward: despite more
67. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lwyer Misconduct to Disciplinary Authorities:
Filling the Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 439-42 (2012); Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney
Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for Change,
62 U. CiN. L. REV. 947 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 751,772-77 (2011); Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, Self Regulation and Consumer Protection: Whither
Thou Goest? 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 53.
68. Barton, supra note 65, at 465, 491-503 (2008); Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and the Public
Interest, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1501, 1512-14 (2002).
69. Many years ago, Milton Friedman addressed the "consumer protection" rationale for professional
regulation by noting that members of the public rarely push for protection; instead, "the pressure invariably
comes from members of the occupation itself." FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 140. Friedman continued wryly that
"[o]f course, [the members of the profession] are more aware than others of how much they exploit the customer
and so perhaps they can lay claim to expert knowledge." Id.
70. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRrrZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY (1999); Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting
Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales, 37 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 765 (2003); see also
Summers, supra note 64, at 238-40 (listing factors that diminish quality in regulated professions).
71. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 170 (noting the rise of online legal services, as well as
"'immigration assistance' or 'divorce assistance' services that help people fill out and file the necessary
documents at low rates").
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than a century of economic protectionism, the American legal profession has
never given low and middle-class Americans the affordable legal services they
need. Indeed, the problem has grown worse with time.n Numerous observers,
from both law and economics, have concluded that poor and middle-income
Americans would obtain better legal assistance if the legal profession were
deregulated. Trade restrictions have not served the poor; an open market holds
the promise of doing so.
Deregulation will impose few costs while generating many benefits. Con-
sumers will benefit from cheaper, more responsive services. Society will derive
positive externalities from the efficient resolution of legal claims. Perhaps most
important for purposes of this essay, lawyers will benefit. Our guild's system for
restricting entry is destroying the lives of too many lawyers. The profession's
intramural tournaments have long tormented students and practitioners, contrib-
uting to high rates of mental illness and substance abuse.7 4 To maintain its profits,
the guild must drive some lawyers out of the profession-an outcome that wastes
training and produces personal heartbreak.
Long, expensive entry paths have compounded the harm. As Professor
Tamanaha so ably documents, these expenses have escalated to the point of
cruelty. Aspiring attorneys can no longer learn to think like a lawyer, practice
their skills, and count on finding a job that will pay off their educational expenses.
Today, law school leads too many of them to high debt and low employment. We
are responsible, as both educators and practitioners, for the harm this system is
causing. Dismantling the walls that protect the lawyer guild is the surest way to
eliminate these destructive paths to entry.
CONCLUSION
Professor Tamanaha has written a book that is both grounded and far-reaching.
Failing Law Schools offers a wealth of sound data and creative proposals; these
have already stimulated discussions in faculty lounges and bar offices across the
72. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL
LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), available at http://www.1sc.gov/pdfs/documenting-the-
justice-gapjin-america_2009.pdf; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS To JUSTICE (2004); Hadfield, Higher Demand, supra note 53, at 130. High levels of professional
debt may contribute further to lawyers' reluctance to offer pro bono services. See Shepherd, supra note 12,
at 461.
73. See, e.g., WINSrON, ET AL., supra note 51, at 91-93; Denise R. Johnson, The Legal Needs of the Poor as a
Starting Point for Systemic Reform, 17 YALE L. & PoCY REV. 479 (1998); Summers, supra note 64, at 244-45.
Cf Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 615
(1994) (advocating greater service to the poor and middle classes by "limit[ing] the professional monopoly to its
historic core-the representation of clients before courts of general jurisdiction").
74. See Laura Rothstein, Law Students and Lawyers with Mental Health and Substance Abuse Problems:
Protecting the Public and the Individual, 69 U. PrrT. L. REV. 531 (2008) (citing sources documenting these
problems in the legal profession and discussing remedies).
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country. As policy makers confront the problems identified by Professor
Tamanaha, they will turn repeatedly to his book for guidance. Equally important,
the book offers a platform for further professional reflection: what are the goals of
our profession? How do law schools contribute to those aims? Do our training
paths offer the best results for lawyers and their clients? Pursuing those questions,
as we have tried to do here, reveals deep cracks in our profession's foundation.
We do not know whether Professor Tamanaha would agree with our particular
analysis; we have built on his insights in our own way. But that is the greatest gift
of Professor Tamanaha's book: it will prompt ongoing exploration of the
challenges facing our profession and the remedies for those ills.

